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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order that reversed the 
magistrate court's order denying Gaylord Jay Colvin's motion to suppress. 
Correctly applying the law to the facts here, this Court should reverse the district 
court's order and remand. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Colvin was pulled over by Officer Jeffory Talbott for failing to signal when 
merging from an ending right lane into the remaining left lane while driving. (R., 
pp. 118-19.) Officer Talbott had followed Colvin for about three or four miles 
before stopping him. (R., p. 117.) During that time, Colvin's vehicle "weaved 
within its lane at times," and "consistently traveled under the speed limit" - 30 
mph in a 35 mph zone. (R., pp. 117-18.) Officer Talbott was driving behind 
Colvin in the left of two southbound lanes when Colvin signaled and changed to 
the right-hand lane. (R., p. 118.) Officer Talbott remained in the left-hand lane. 
(R., p. 118.) 
Colvin passed a yellow, diamond-shaped traffic sign - in the right-hand 
shoulder of the road- indicating that the right lane was merging into the left. (R., 
p. 118.) Colvin "passed through the area where the two southbound lanes 
converged and continued south in the single remaining southbound lane." (R., p. 
118.) While he merged left- that is, while he "traveled through the area where 
the two southbound lanes converged into a single remaining southbound lane" -
"Colvin did not use any signals." (R., pp. 118-19.) Officer Talbott stopped Colvin 
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"for failing to signal, in violation of I. C. § 49-808." (R., p. 11 9.) Officer Talbott 
administered field sobriety tests on Colvin, then arrested and cited Colvin for 
driving under the influence. (R., pp. 7-10, 119.) The state charged Colvin with 
"second offense DUI." (R., p. 16.) 
Colvin moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his traffic stop. 
(R., pp. 52-54, 77-93, 119.) The magistrate court conducted a hearing at which 
Officer Talbott testified. (R., pp. 113-14.) The magistrate admitted into evidence 
Officer Talbott's dashboard video of Colvin's driving leading up to the traffic stop. 
(R., p. 114; see Video, Exhibit A.) The magistrate determined that I.C. § 49-808 
is not unconstitutionally vague, and that Officer Talbott initiated a lawful 
investigative detention of Colvin. (R., p. 126.) The magistrate denied Colvin's 
motion to suppress. (R., p. 135.) 
Colvin pleaded guilty pursuant to a conditional plea agreement. (R., pp. 
141-44.) Per that agreement, Colvin appealed to the district court. (R., pp. 154-
56.) The district court heard oral argument and entered an appellate order 
reversing the magistrate's decision. (R., pp. 208-20.) The state timely appealed. 
(R., pp. 223-25.) 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it reversed and remanded the magistrate court's 
order denying Colvin's motion to suppress, because the record and applicable 
law, including the pertinent constitutional analysis, support the magistrate's 




The District Court Erred When It Reversed And Remanded The Magistrate 
Court's Order Denying Colvin's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
In Colvin's interim appeal, the district court reversed the magistrate court's 
order that denied Colvin's motion to suppress. (R., p. 220.) In doing so, the 
district court erroneously concluded that Officer Talbott lacked legal cause to 
stop Colvin's vehicle for failing to signal as required by I.C. § 49-808(1). (R., p. 
220.) Applying Idaho case law to the facts, Officer Talbott properly stopped 
Colvin for violation of I.C. § 49-808(1). Moreover, under United States Supreme 
Court precedent, the denial of a suppression motion is properly analyzed under 
the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, as analyzed by the 
district court below and by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Burton v. State, 149 
Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2010). Applying a Fourth Amendment 
analysis here, Officer Talbott had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Colvin, 
thus the magistrate court correctly denied Colvin's motion to suppress. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's appellate decision. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court directly reviews a decision by a district court made in 
its appellate capacity. State v. Decker, 152 Idaho 142, 145, 267 P.3d 729, 732 
(Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). The appellate court accepts the magistrate's 
factual findings supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely 
reviews legal conclusions. State v. Green, 149 Idaho 706, 708, 239 P.3d 811, 
813 (Ct. App. 201 0); Decker, 152 Idaho at 145, 267 P.3d at 732. Where the 
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magistrate's decision is supported by the record and law, and where the district 
court affirmed, the appellate court will affirm "as a matter of procedure." ~ 
C. Applying State v. Dewbre, Officer Talbott Properly Stopped Colvin's 
Vehicle For Failing To Signal As Required By I. C.§ 49-808(1) 
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). 
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be 
reasonable. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop, 
146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory 
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by 
an officer's reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is 
about to commit, a crime. Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 
P.3d at 1210. 
"An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal 
behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being 
driven contrary to traffic laws." Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)). "Reasonable suspicion requires 
less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the 
officer." State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 201 0) 
(citation omitted). Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is 
evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or 
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before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210; State v. 
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Idaho Code § 49-808 governs the use of turn signals on Idaho highways 
and provides, in relevant part: 
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle 
right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway 
unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety 
nor without giving an appropriate signal. 
I.C. § 49-808(1). The Idaho Court of Appeals has addressed this provision in 
State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999), and Burton v. 
State, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2010). Applying those decisions 
here, the district court's decision was in error. 
In Dewbre, the defendant was driving on a two-lane highway when his 
single lane split into two to permit passing. Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 664, 991 P.2d 
at 389. At the start of the passing area, there was a sign "directing traffic to stay 
to the right except to pass." 19-=. Complying with the sign, Dewbre moved his 
vehicle into the right lane, then moved left when the two lanes merged back into 
one. 19-=. A police officer stopped Dewbre for violation of I.C. § 49-808, and the 
state charged Dewbre with driving under the influence based on evidence 
gathered during the stop. lQ_,_ 
On appeal, Dewbre argued the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop 
him under I.C. § 49-808, thus the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights . .!9-=. 
at 665, 991 P.2d at 390. Although Dewbre challenged I.C. § 49-808 as 
unconstitutionally vague, the Court declined to address the issue because 
Dewbre had not raised it below. .!9-=. at 667, 991 P.3d at 392. The Court 
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determined, "[t]he language of I.C. § 49-808 is plain and unambiguous and must 
be given effect." JJt at 666, 991 P.2d at 391. The Court noted that, upon 
entering and exiting the passing area, Dewbre "moved his vehicle to the right ... 
[then] moved his vehicle to the Jeff' to comply with the highway signage. ls;L 
(emphasis original). Applying the statute, the Court concluded, "I.C. § 49-808 
required Dewbre to use an appropriate signal." JJt The Court also wrote, "[u]ntil 
further clarification is provided by the Idaho legislature," I. C. § 49-808 requires an 
appropriate signal "whenever a vehicle moves to the right or to the left because 
one lane splits into two lanes, or two lanes merge into one lane." & 
The Idaho legislature has offered no additional guidance. Here, as in 
Dewbre, Colvin moved his vehicle to the left because two lanes merged into one 
lane. (R., pp. 118-19.) Applying Dewbre, Officer Talbott had reasonable 
suspicion that Colvin violated I.C. § 49-808, and was therefore justified in 
stopping Colvin's vehicle. 
D. The Facts Here Are Distinguishable From Those In State v. Burton 
In reversing the magistrate court's decision, the district court examined 
Burton and determined that the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to Colvin's 
case. (R., pp. 213-20.) However, the facts in Burton are distinguishable from 
Colvin's circumstance. In Burton, the defendant was driving on a two-lane 
highway "when her lane of travel expanded to include a left-hand lane to be used 
only for passing." 149 Idaho at 747, 240 P.3d at 934. Burton did not enter the 
passing lane, but stayed in the right-hand lane. & Toward the end of the 
passing area, Burton "saw a traffic sign indicating 'that the lanes merged."' & 
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Burton did not signal, and an officer stopped her car "for failure to signal before 
moving 'right or left upon [the] highway"' in violation of I. C. § 49-808(1 ). ~ 
Breath tests showed Burton's blood alcohol content was in excess of the legal 
limit, and her license was suspended. ~ Burton appealed, arguing her license 
suspension should be vacated because I. C. § 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to her. ~at 748, 240 P.3d at 935. 
The Burton Court distinguished Dewbre, noting that the "road signs and 
arrows on the roadway informed [Dewbre] that the right-hand lane was ending 
and that traffic must merge into the surviving, left-hand lane." ~ at 749, 240 
P.3d at 936. The Court highlighted that, in Burton's case, "there is no evidence 
of such signage or other indicator that one lane was ending and the other 
surviving." ~ Also, the Court noted, "the statute plainly requires a signal [in 
Dewbre's circumstance] because a driver in the terminating lane must change 
lanes in order to continue travel on the highway, and changing lanes constitutes 
a move to the left or right." ~ In contrast, Burton had "no basis to discern that 
one lane [was] terminating and the other surviving," instead, her two lanes 
"blend[ed] into a single lane." ~ Accordingly, it was not clear "that the 
continued forward movement of a vehicle from either of the two lanes into the 
emerging lane constitute[d] a 'move ... right or left' that [was] subject to the 
Section 49-808(1) signal requirement." ~ 
Colvin's circumstance is comparable to that in Dewbre. The signage that 
Colvin encountered - as encountered by Dewbre - indicated that the right lane 
was ending, and the left lane was surviving. (R., p. 118.) As in Dewbre, and per 
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the Court's analysis in Burton, "the statute plainly requires a signal" in Colvin's 
circumstance because Colvin's lane was terminating. See Burton, 149 Idaho at 
749, 240 P.3d at 936; Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 666, 991 P.2d at 391. To continue 
his travel on the roadway, Colvin had to change lanes, which "constitute[d] a 
move to the left." ~ Applying Dewbre, the road signs clearly indicated that 
Colvin's right lane was ending and he needed to move into the surviving left lane, 
thus requiring him to signal under I. C. § 49-808(1 ). 
E. Statutory Vagueness Is Not A Ground For Suppression 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a constitutionally valid 
seizure is not rendered invalid by a subsequent determination that the law on 
which the seizure was based is unconstitutionally vague. See Michigan v. 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979); see also United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 
1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1999). In DeFillippo, the defendant was detained and later 
arrested for violation of a Detroit municipal code, providing that it was "unlawful 
for any person [suspected of criminal activity] to refuse to identify himself and 
produce evidence of his identity." ~ at 33. DeFillippo was searched and later 
charged with possession of a controlled substance found during that search. ~ 
at 34. DeFillippo moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, 
which the trial court denied. ~ The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, and 
after the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, the U.S. Supreme 
Court granted the state's petition for certiorari. ~at 34-35. The U.S. Supreme 
Court concluded the motion to suppress was properly denied and reversed the 
Michigan Court of Appeals' decision. ~ at 40. 
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The Court in DeFillippo found, "On this record there was abundant 
probable cause to satisfy the constitutional prerequisite for an arrest." ~ at 37. 
The Court also found that, at the time, "there was no controlling precedent that 
this ordinance was or was not constitutional, and hence the conduct observed 
violated a presumptively valid ordinance." ~ "Police are charged to enforce 
laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional." ~ at 38. "Society 
would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon themselves to determine 
which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement." ~ 
The Court held, "The subsequently determined invalidity of the Detroit ordinance 
on vagueness grounds does not undermine the validity of the arrest made for 
violation of that ordinance, and the evidence discovered in the search of 
respondent should not have been suppressed." ~ at 40. In other words, for 
purposes of suppression, it is immaterial that DeFillippo's arrest was for violation 
of an ordinance later deemed void for vagueness. ~; see also Dexter, 165 F .3d 
at 1125. 
The district court relied on the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in Burton 
to hold that suppression was the correct remedy for Colvin's vagueness 
challenge. (R., pp. 218-19.) However, such a holding conflicts with the holding 
in DeFillippo. In Burton, the Court concluded that I. C. § 49-808(1) was 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton. Burton, 149 Idaho at 748-49, 240 
P.3d at 935-36. The Burton Court reasoned that I.C. § 49-808(1) failed to 
provide sufficient notice that "a signal is required when two lanes blend into one." 
~ As already discussed, the facts under which the statute was deemed vague 
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as applied to Burton distinguish Burton from Dewbre and from Colvin's case. 1 
On those facts, the Burton Court concluded, "no legal cause existed to effectuate 
the traffic stop that led to her breath tests." Burton, 149 Idaho at 750, 240 P.3d 
at 937. However, the Court in Burton employed no Fourth Amendment analysis. 2 
See id. Moreover, the Court cited no authority for the proposition that the remedy 
for the statute's vagueness is suppression of evidence. See id. 
The issue here, as in Burton, is whether evidence obtained from the traffic 
stop- for violation of I. C. § 49-808- should be suppressed. A determination that 
I. C. § 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague would warrant dismissal of a charge for 
failing to signal a lane change under that provision. But under DeFillippo, for 
purposes of suppression, it is immaterial whether I. C. § 49-808(1) is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Colvin. Given the facts here, I. C. § 49-808 
is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Colvin. But even if it were, a court's 
finding as such would not undermine the validity of Officer Talbott's detention of 
Colvin for violating I.C. § 49-808. To the extent Burton conflicts with that 
analysis, DeFillippo controls. Applying DeFillippo and the facts in Colvin's case, 
Officer Talbott had a constitutionally adequate basis to stop Colvin for violating 
1 As in Dewbre, Colvin's duty to signal was triggered because the road sign 
clearly indicated his right lane would end, and the left lane would remain. The 
magistrate's findings included a picture of the sign that Colvin encountered, 
directing traffic to merge to the left. (R., p. 118.) Because the road sign clearly 
alerted Colvin that he needed to move from his lane on the right to the surviving 
left lane, too holding in Burton does not apply. 
2 Given the facts in Burton, it appears that application of a Fourth Amendment 
analysis may have yielded the same result: because two lanes blended into one 
without signage indicating which lane ended and which remained, the officer may 
have lacked reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton changed lanes without 
signaling. 
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I. C. § 49-808. (See R., pp. 117-19.) Accordingly, the magistrate's order denying 
Colvin's motion to suppress was correct, and the district court's opinion and order 
is in error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
appellate decision and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 18th day of June, 2014. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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